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Policymaking during a pandemic can be extremely challenging. As COVID-19 is a new disease and its
global impacts are unprecedented, decisions are taken in a highly uncertain, complex, and rapidly chang-
ing environment. In such a context, in which human lives and the economy are at stake, we argue that
using ideas and constructs from modern decision theory, even informally, will make policymaking a more
responsible and transparent process.
model uncertainty | ambiguity | robustness
The COVID-19 pandemic exposes decision problems
faced by governments and international organiza-
tions. Policymakers are charged with taking actions
to protect their population from the disease while
lacking reliable information on the virus and its trans-
mission mechanisms and on the effectiveness of pos-
sible measures and their (direct and indirect) health
and socioeconomic consequences. The rational policy
decision would combine the best available scientific
evidence—typically provided by expert opinions and
modeling studies. However, in an uncertain and rap-
idly changing environment, the pertinent evidence is
highly fluid, making it challenging to produce scientif-
ically grounded predictions of the outcomes of alter-
native courses of action.
A great deal of attention has been paid to how
policymakers have handled uncertainty in the COVID-
19 response (1–6). Policymakers have been con-
fronted with very different views on the potential out-
break scenarios stemming from divergent experts’
assessments or differing modeling predictions. In the
face of such uncertainty, policymakers may respond
by attempting to balance the alternative perspectives,
or they may fully embrace one without a concern that
this can vastly misrepresent our underlying knowledge
base (7). This tendency to lock on to a single narrative—
or more generally, this inability to handle uncertainty—
may result in overlooking valuable insights from alter-
native sources, and thus in misinterpreting the state of
the COVID-19 outbreak, potentially leading to subop-
timal decisions with possibly disastrous consequences
(2, 8–10).
This paper argues that insights from decision
theory provide a valuable way to frame policy chal-
lenges and ambitions. Even if the decision-theory con-
structs are ultimately used only informally in practice,
they offer a useful guide for transparent policymaking
that copes with the severe uncertainty in sensible
ways. First, we outline a framework to understand
and guide decision-making under uncertainty in the
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COVID-19 pandemic context. Second, we show how formal deci-
sion rules could be used to guide policymaking and illustrate their
use with the example of school closures. These decision rules allow
policymakers to recognize that they do not know which of themany
potential scenarios is “correct” and to act accordingly by taking
precautionary and robust decisions, that is, that remain valid for a
wide range of futures and keep options open (11). Third, we discuss
directions to define a more transparent approach for communicat-
ing the degree of certainty in scientific findings and knowledge,
particularly relevant to decision-makers managing pandemics.
Decision under Uncertainty
The Policymaker’s Problem(s). The decision-making problem
faced by a high-level government policymaker during a crisis like
the COVID-19 pandemic is not trivial. In the first stage, when a
new infectious disease appears, the policymaker may attempt to
contain the outbreak by taking early actions to control onward
transmission (e.g., isolation of confirmed and suspected cases and
contact tracing). If this phase is unsuccessful, policymakers face a
second-stage decision problem that consists of determining the
appropriate level, timing, and duration of interventions to miti-
gate the course of clinical infection. These interventions may in-
clude banning mass gatherings, closing schools, and more
extreme “lockdown” restrictions.
While these measures are expected to reduce the pandemic’s
health burden by lowering the peak incidence, they also impose
costs on society. For instance, they may have adverse impacts on
mental health, domestic abuse, and job loss at a more personal
level. Moreover, there are societal losses due to the immediate
reduced economic activity coupled with a potentially prolonged
recession and adverse impacts on longer-term health and social
gradients. Policymakers must thus promptly cope with a complex
and multifaceted picture of direct and indirect, proximal and
distal, health, and socioeconomic trade-offs. In the acute phase of
the pandemic, the trade-off between reducing mortality and
morbidity and its associated socioeconomic consequences may
seem relatively straightforward. Still, once out of this critical
phase, most trade-offs are difficult and costly. How should the
policymaker decide when and how to introduce or relax measures
in a justifiable way, not just from a health and economic per-
spective but also politically? The answer critically depends on the
prioritization and balance of potentially conflicting objectives (12).
Scientific Evidence and the Role of Modeling. Scientific
knowledge is foundational to the prevention, management,
and treatment of global outbreaks. Some of this evidence can
be summarized in pandemic preparedness and response
plans (at both international and national levels) or might be
directly obtained from panels of scientists with expertise in
relevant areas of research, such as epidemiologists, infectious dis-
ease modelers, and social scientists. An essential part of the scientific
evidence comes from quantitative models (13). Quantitative models
are abstract representations of reality that provide a logically con-
sistent way to organize thinking about the relationships among vari-
ables of interest. They combine what is known in general with what is
known about the current outbreak to produce predictions to help
guide policy decisions (14).
Epidemiological models (e.g., refs. 15 and 16) have been used
to guide decision-making by assessing what is likely to happen to
the transmission of the virus if policy interventions—either inde-
pendently or in combination—were put in place. Such public
health-oriented models are particularly useful in the short term to
project the direct consequences of policy interventions on the
epidemic trajectory and to guide decisions on resource alloca-
tions (17). As the measures put in place also largely affect the
economic environment, decision-makers must, at least implicitly,
confront trade-offs in the health- and nonhealth-related economic
consequences. To weigh these trade-offs necessarily requires
more than epidemiological models. For example, health policy
analysis models, such as computable general equilibrium models,
are used to simultaneously estimate the direct and indirect im-
pacts of the outbreak on various aspects of the economy, such as
labor supply, government budgets, or household consumption
(18). More recent integrated assessment models combine eco-
nomics and epidemiology by incorporating simplified epidemio-
logical models of contagion within stylized dynamic economic
frameworks. Such models address critical policy challenges by
explicitly modeling dynamic adjustment paths and endogenous
responses to changing incentives. They have been used to in-
vestigate the optimal policy response or alternative macroeco-
nomic policies’ effectiveness to the economic shocks due to the
COVID-19 pandemic (19–22). However, these different modeling
approaches do not formally incorporate uncertainty; instead, they
treat it ex-post, for example using sensitivity analyses.
Uncertainty. Decisions within a pandemic context have to be
made under overwhelming time pressure and amid high scientific
uncertainty, with minimal quality evidence and potential disagree-
ments among experts and models. In the COVID-19 outbreak,
there was uncertainty about the virus’s essential characteristics,
such as its transmissibility, severity, and natural history (3, 23, 24).
This state of knowledge translates into uncertainty about the system
dynamics, which renders uncertain the consequences of alternative
policy interventions such as closing down schools or wearing masks
in public. At a later stage of the pandemic, information overload
becomes an issue, making it more difficult for the decision-maker to
identify useful and good-quality evidence. The consequence is that,
given the many uncertainties they are built on, no single model can
be genuinely predictive in the context of an outbreak management
strategy. Yet, if their results are used as insights providing potential
quantitative stories among alternative ones, models can offer pol-
icymakers guidance by helping them understand the fragments of
information available, uncover what might be going on, and
eventually determine the appropriate policy response. The dis-
tinction between three layers of uncertainty—uncertainty within
models, across models, and about models—can help the policy-
maker understand the extent of the problem (25–28).
Uncertainty within models reflects the standard notion of risk:
uncertain outcomes with known probabilities. Models may in-
clude random shocks or impulses with prespecified distributions.
It is the modeling counterpart to flipping coins or rolling dice in
which we have full confidence in the probability assessment.
Uncertainty across models encompasses both the unknown
parameters for a family of models or more discrete modeling
differences in specification. Thus, it relates to unknown inputs
needed to construct fully specified probability models. In the
COVID-19 context, this corresponds, for example, to the uncer-
tainty of some model parameters, such as how much transmission
occurs in different age groups or how infectious people can be
before they have symptoms. Existing data, if available and reli-
able, can help calibrate these model inputs. An additional chal-
lenge for the policymaker is the proliferation of modeling groups,
researchers, and experts in various disciplines (epidemiology,
economics, and other social sciences). Each of these provides
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forecasts and projections about the disease’s evolution and/or its
socioeconomic consequences. This uncertainty across models
and their consequent predictions may be difficult to handle by
policymakers, especially as one approach is not necessarily su-
perior to another but simply adds another perspective (29). There
is no single “view.” Analysis of this form of uncertainty is typically
the focal point of statistical approaches. Bayesian analyses, for
instance, confront this via the use of subjective probabilities,
whereas robust Bayesians explore sensitivity to prior inputs. De-
cision theory explores the ramifications of subjective uncertainty,
as there might be substantial variation in the recommendations
across different models and experts, reflecting other specific
choices and assumptions regarding modeling type and structure.
Finally, as models are, by design, simplifications of more
complex phenomena, they are necessarily misspecified, at least
along some dimensions. For instance, they might not mention
certain variables that matter, which modelers are or are not aware
of, or they may be limited in the scope of functional relationships
considered, unknown forms of specification and measurement
errors, and so forth. Consequently, there is also uncertainty about
the models’ assumptions and structures. It might sometimes be
challenging, even for experts, to assess the merits and limits of
alternative models and predictions.* This is what we mean in our
reference to uncertainty about models.
How to Make Rational Decisions under Uncertainty?
Now that we have characterized the elements of the decision
problem under uncertainty (Fig. 1), the question remains on how
to make the best possible decision. In other words, how should
the policymaker proceed to aggregate the different (and usu-
ally conflicting) scientific findings, model results, and expert
opinions—which are all uncertain by construction and by lack of
reliable data—and ultimately determine policy? Insights from
modern decision theory are of the most significant value at this
stage. They propose normative guidelines and “rules” to help
policymakers make the best, that is, the most rational, decision
under uncertainty.
How Can Formal Decision Rules Be Useful? The formal decision
rules proposed by decision theorists are powerful, mathematically
founded† tools that relate theoretical constructs and choice pro-
cedures to presumably observable data. Making a decision based
on such rules is equivalent to complying implicitly with a set of
general consistency conditions or principles governing human
behavior. During a crisis such as the COVID-19 pandemic, using
decision theory as a formal guide will lend credibility to policy-
making by ensuring that the resulting actions are coherent and
defensible. To illustrate how decision theory can serve as a co-
herence test (31), imagine the case of a policymaker trying to
determine what the best response to the current pandemic is. The
decision-makers can make up their minds by whatever mix of in-
tuition, expert advice, imitation, and quantitative model results
they have available and then check their judgment by asking
whether they can justify the decision using a formal decision rule.
Conceptually, it can be seen as a form of dialogue between the
policymakers and decision theory, in which an attempt to justify a
tentative decision helps to clarify the problem and, perhaps, leads
to a different conclusion (32). Used this way, formal decision rules
may help policymakers clarify the problem they are dealing with,
test their intuition, eliminate strictly dominated options, and avoid
reasoning mistakes and pitfalls that have been documented
in psychological studies (e.g., confirmation bias, optimism bias,
representativeness heuristic, prospect theory, etc.) (33).
Finally, because committees might investigate how decisions
were taken during the crisis, for example about how lockdown
measures were implemented and lifted, policymakers are held to
account for the actions they took. A formal decision model can
play an essential role in defending one’s choice and generating
ex-post justifiability. For example, it could help a policymaker who
had to decide which neighborhoods to keep under lockdown and
which not to explain the process that led to such decisions to
citizens who might think they have not been treated fairly.
Which Decision Rule to Follow? As decision theory proposes a
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Fig. 1. Overview of the decision problem under uncertainty.
*Note that another way to see this additional layer of uncertainty is as uncer-
tainty over predictions of alternative models that have not been developed yet.
†Typically, each of these rules results from an axiomatization [i.e., an equiva-
lence result taking the form of a theorem that relates a theoretical description
of decision-making to conditions on observable data (30)].
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the call for using decision theory begs the question, Which rules to
follow? The answer depends, in our opinion, on the society or
organization in question. Decision theory should offer a gamut of
models, and the people for whom decisions are made should find
acceptable the model that is considered to “provide a justifica-
tion” for a given decision. Thus, the answer ultimately depends on
the policymakers’ characteristics, for example which conditions or
behavioral principles they want to comply with, how prudent they
want the policy to be, or what answer their constituency expects
to receive. In Fig. 2, we present a simple example of school clo-
sures’ decision problem during the COVID-19 pandemic. We use
this to demonstrate how distinct quantitative model outputs
(some of which represent “best guesses” while others represent
“reasonable worst-case”‡ possibilities) can be combined and
used in formal decision rules, and what the resulting recommen-
dations in terms of policy responses are.
The policymaker’s problem consists in finding the right bal-
ance between protecting the health and preventing economic
and social disruptions by choosing whether and for how long to
keep schools closed, given the scarce scientific evidence and the
disagreement that may exist across model projections, possibly
leading to significantly different policies.
The decision rules that we present differ primarily in how they
handle probabilities. According to the Bayesian view, which holds
that any source of uncertainty can be quantified probabilistically,
the policymaker should always have well-defined probabilities
about the impacts of the measures taken. If they rely on quanti-
tative model outputs or expert advice to obtain different esti-
mates, then they should attach a well-defined probability weight
to each of these and compute an average. Thus, in the absence of
objective probabilities, the decision-makers have their own sub-
jective probabilities to guide decisions.
However, it may not always be rational to follow this approach
(34–37). Its limitation stems from its inability to distinguish be-
tween uncertainty across models (which has an epistemic nature
and is due to limited knowledge or ignorance) and uncertainty
within models (which has an aleatory nature and is due to the
intrinsic randomness in the world). In the response to the COVID-
19 outbreak, the Bayesian approach requires the policymaker to
express probabilistic beliefs (about the impact of a policy, about
the correctness of a given model, etc.), without being told which
probability it makes sense to adopt or being allowed to say “I
don’t know.” Because of the disagreements that may exist across
different model outputs, or expert opinions, another path may be
to acknowledge one’s ignorance and relax the assumption that we
can associate precise probabilities to any event. Modern decision
theory proposes decision rules in line with this non-Bayesian ap-
proach. The axiomatic approach on which it is founded serves as
an essential guide in understanding the merits and limitations of
alternative ways to confront uncertainty formally. While we do not
see this theory as settling on a single recipe for all decision
problems, it adds important clarity to the rationale behind
alternative decision rules.
Discussion
The decision rules presented in Fig. 2 are fully compatible with
normative interpretations and could be particularly useful to de-
sign robust policies in this COVID-19 pandemic context. They
assume that policymakers cope with uncertainty without reducing
everything to risk, a pretension that tacitly presumes better in-
formation than they typically have. When exploring alternative
courses of action, policymakers are necessarily unsure of the
consequences. In such a context, sticking to the Bayesian
expected utility paradigm not only requires substantive expertise
(in weighting the pros and cons of alternative models) but also
overshadows the policymaker’s reaction to the variability that may
exist across models. While we focus, in Fig. 2, on a subset of
decision rules, which can be checked for logical consistency, it
should be clear, however, that other criteria, such as minmax re-
gret (38), also exist and have been used in some applied contexts
(39, 40). As mentioned above, we believe that a decision criterion
is also a matter of personal preferences, which should somehow
be aggregated over the different individuals for whom the deci-
sions are made. Thus, the examples used in this paper are
inevitably subjective, too.
We recognize the challenges in using decision theory when the
decision-making process itself is complicated and many partici-
pants are involved with potentially different incentives. Never-
theless, we also see value to its use in less formal ways as
guideposts to prudent decision-making and as a sensible way of
framing the uncertainties in the trade-offs that policymakers are
presented with.
In this example, the decision problem setup has been delib-
erately kept to minimal complexity to focus on the decision theory
aspects. In particular, the set of actions is here limited to a single
intervention (the duration of the school closure). In reality, the
decision problem would, of course, require a much higher di-
mensional space (e.g., selective local closures, school dismissal,
etc.), the interaction with other social distancing measures, or the
ability to integrate start and stop times. Along the same lines, time
constraints, learning, and dynamic considerations have been as-
sumed away for the sake of tractability. In reality, it should be clear
that the existence of deadlines could restrict which actions are
feasible so that different sets of actions may correspond to
different timings.
Similarly, as time passes, experts learn more about virus
transmission and disease dynamics, which ultimately leads them
to update their projections. Different “updating rules” allow in-
corporating such new information into the decision-making pro-
cess. Our general message is the same as the one concerning the
decision rules: The decision-maker should make her choice of the
updating rule and be able to justify her decision based on this rule
and the conditions that it does or does not satisfy. Finally, for
expositional simplicity, we also abstracted from concerns about
model misspecification, while recognizing this to be an integral
part of how decision-makers should view the alternative models or
perspectives that they confronted.
Concluding Remarks
During a period of crisis, policymakers, who make decisions on
behalf of others, may be required to provide a protocol that
suggests a decision-theoretic model supporting their decisions.
Decision theory can contribute to a pandemic response by pro-
viding a way to organize a large amount of potentially conflicting
scientific knowledge and providing rules for evaluating response
options and turning them into concrete decision-making.
In this paper, we have highlighted the importance of quanti-
tative modeling to support policy decisions [the same recom-
mendation has also been made in other public health contexts
(40)]. This use of models is common in different macroeconomic
‡As these projections are typically premised on “reasonable” bounds in terms of
their model inputs.
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Fig. 2. Case study. School closures and their length during the COVID-19 pandemic (see refs. 52–69). Details are provided in SI Appendix.
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settings, including the assessments of monetary and fiscal poli-
cies. Some may see quantitative modeling as problematic be-
cause it requires seemingly arbitrary subjective judgments about
the correctness of the different model specifications, leading
them to prefer qualitative approaches. Even qualitative methods
cannot escape the need for subjective inputs, however. Restrict-
ing scientific inputs to be only qualitative limits severely poten-
tially valuable inputs into prudent policymaking. Instead, we
argue in favor of using quantitative models and data, including
explicit information about our underlying knowledge’s limits. We
propose decision rules that incorporate the decisionmaker’s
confidence in her subjective probabilities, thus rendering the
decision-making process based on formal quantitative rules both
robust and prudent.
In practical terms, ensuring that policy options are in line with
formal decision rules could be achieved by having a decision
analyst in the group of advisors to nurture a dialogue between
policymakers and decision theory. This dialogue could clarify the
trade-offs and encourage a more sanguine response to the un-
certainties present when assessing the alternative courses of ac-
tion and result in an improved policy outcome (31, 41).
To make the decision-making process under uncertainty more
efficient, we also suggest acknowledging and communicating the
various uncertainties transparently (42). For example, illustrating,
quantifying, and discussing the multiple sources of uncertainty
may help policymakers better understand their choices’ potential
impact. To this aim, modelers should provide all information
needed to reconstruct the analysis, including information about
model structures, assumptions, and parameter values. Moreover,
the way uncertainty around these choices affects model results
needs to be accurately communicated, such as systematically
reporting uncertainty boundaries around the estimates provided
(43). Scientific and policy advisors would then need to synthesize
all this information (32)—coming from diverse sources across dif-
ferent disciplines, possibly of different quality—to help policy-
makers turning it into actionable information for decisions, while
making sure the complete range of uncertainty (including within
and across models) is clearly reported and understood properly
(44, 45).
One possible way to go is to enhance standardization by de-
veloping and adopting standard metrics to evaluate and com-
municate the degree of certainty in key findings. While several
approaches have been proposed (46), insights could, for example,
be gained from the virtues and the shortcomings of the reports of
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (47). Another
way is to develop further communication and collaboration be-
tween model developers and decision-makers to improve the
quality and utility of models and the decisions they support (48).
Finally, while policymakers are responsible for making deci-
sions, they are also responsible for communicating to profes-
sionals and the public. The way individuals respond to advice and
measures selected is as vital as government actions, if not more
(3). Communication should thus be an essential part of the policy
response to uncertainty. In particular, government communica-
tion strategies to keep the public informed of what we [do not (49)]
know should balance the costs and benefits of revealing infor-
mation (how much, and in what form) (50).
As government strategies have been extensively debated in
the media and models have become more scrutinized, one lesson
learned from the COVID-19 management experience may be that
policymakers and experts must increase their approaches’ trans-
parency. Using the constructs from decision theory in policy-
making, even in an informal way, will help ensure prudent
navigation through the uncertainty that pervades this and possibly
future pandemics. Being open about the degree of uncertainty
surrounding the scientific evidence used to guide policy choices
and allowing for the assumptions of the models used or for the
decision-making process itself to be challenged is a valuable way
of retaining public trust (51). At the same time, it is essential to
counteract what is too often displayed by self-described experts
who seek to influence policymakers and the public by projecting a
pretense of knowledge that is likely to be false.
Materials
Supplementary information is included in SI Appendix,Methods Supplement to
Figure 2.
Data Availability. There are no data underlying this work.
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